Keep updated
Get in touch
| Type | Person | [sources] | |||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Name | RAHMAN, Reza Kazemifar · REZA KAZEMIFAR · Reza Kazemifar Rahman · رضا کاظمیفر رحمان | [sources] | |||
| Alias | KAZEMIFAR, Reza · Reza Kazemifar | [sources] | |||
| Birth date | [sources] | ||||
| Place of birth | Ilam, Iran | [sources] | |||
| Gender | male | [sources] | |||
| Nationality | Iran | [sources] | |||
| Country | Iran | [sources] | |||
| Eye color | Brown | [sources] | |||
| First name | REZA KAZEMIFAR · Reza · رضا | [sources] | |||
| Hair color | Black and Gray | [sources] | |||
| ID Number | 3946 · 4501201381 | [sources] | |||
| Last name | Kazemifar · RAHMAN · رحمان | [sources] | |||
| Middle name | Kazemifar · کاظمیفر | [sources] | |||
| Unique Entity ID | DL83RJ5C9FL8 · HMPRZRT9M143 | [sources] | |||
| Address | TEHRAN · Tehran · Tehran Iran | [sources] | |||
| Source link | home.treasury.gov · sanctionssearch.ofac.treas.gov · www.fbi.gov | [sources] | |||
| Last change | Last processed | First seen | |||
NCIC: W132675023
Languages: Farsi, English
Reza Kazemifar is wanted for his alleged involvement in malicious cyber activity against United States companies and individuals from May of 2017 to October of 2021. Kazemifar allegedly supported and engaged in cyber campaigns against United States companies and federal agencies utilizing spearphishing emails and online social engineering. At the time of their activity, Kazemifar was known to have been employed by both Mahak Rayan Afraz, a Tehran-based software company, and the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps Electronic Warfare and Cyber Defense Organization. A federal arrest warrant was issued for Kazemifar in the United States District Court, Southern District of New York, after he was charged with Conspiracy to Commit Computer Fraud; Wire Fraud; and Conspiracy to Commit Wire Fraud.
(also REZA KAZEMIFAR RAHMAN)
(also REZA KAZEMIFAR)
A database of suppliers who have been excluded from participating in US federal procurement.
United States · GSA
Entities subject to export restrictions due to concerns about the end-use or end-users, particularly relating to weapons of mass destruction (WMD) or other military applications.
Taiwan · MOEA
The primary United States' sanctions list, specially designated nationals (SDN) part.
United States · OFAC
The FBI Ten Most Wanted Fugitives is a most wanted list maintained by the United States's Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI).
United States · FBI
The Consolidated Screening List (CSL) is a list of parties for which the United States Government maintains restrictions on certain exports, re-exports, or transfers of items.
United States · ITA
The record has been enriched with data from the following external databases:
US OFAC press releases that provide context and details related to sanctioned entities.
External dataset · United States · OFAC
ofac-pr-815866deeec22304e54c7f9b78ca1be9989d1de9 · tw-shtc-083752bbbb1e3d123f49e659f2c04fde90cd4fc2 · usgsa-s4mrtl50n · usgsa-s4mrtxskb · ofac-48647 · us-fbi-reza-kazemifar · tw-shtc-2f1d7f606b63997a47b16df9f3f74d77d82e0597For experts: raw data explorer
OpenSanctions is free for non-commercial users. Businesses must acquire a data license to use the dataset.
| Address | ||
|---|---|---|
| Full address | Country | |
| Tehran | Iran | |
| Clients | ||||
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Client | Role | Start date | End date | |
| Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps Electronic Warfare and Cyber Defense Organization Debarred entity · Export controlled · Sanctioned entity | Acting for or on behalf of | - | - | |
| United States | TREAS-OFAC | Reciprocal | - |
| United States | Office of Foreign Assets Control | Counter Terrorism | - | - |
4501201381| Iran |
| National ID No. |
| - |
| - |