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IDPropertyValueLangSource datasetSource IDFirst seen
gb-hmt-f06f324cf5806ad2f716222f15aa09b55db4bd5bSanction:authorityUKgb_hmt_sanctionsgb-hmt-f06f324cf5806ad2f716222f15aa09b55db4bd5b
gb-hmt-f06f324cf5806ad2f716222f15aa09b55db4bd5bSanction:authorityOffice of Financial Sanctions Implementationgb_hmt_sanctionsgb-hmt-f06f324cf5806ad2f716222f15aa09b55db4bd5b
gb-hmt-f06f324cf5806ad2f716222f15aa09b55db4bd5bSanction:authorityIdCHW0015gb_hmt_sanctionsgb-hmt-f06f324cf5806ad2f716222f15aa09b55db4bd5b
gb-hmt-f06f324cf5806ad2f716222f15aa09b55db4bd5bSanction:countrygbgb_hmt_sanctionsgb-hmt-f06f324cf5806ad2f716222f15aa09b55db4bd5b
gb-hmt-f06f324cf5806ad2f716222f15aa09b55db4bd5bSanction:entitygb-hmt-13973gb_hmt_sanctionsgb-hmt-f06f324cf5806ad2f716222f15aa09b55db4bd5b
gb-hmt-f06f324cf5806ad2f716222f15aa09b55db4bd5bSanction:ide0eed1c93b5aa25d5956f454c4de420a4fefcf16gb_hmt_sanctionsgb-hmt-f06f324cf5806ad2f716222f15aa09b55db4bd5b
gb-hmt-f06f324cf5806ad2f716222f15aa09b55db4bd5bSanction:listingDate2020gb_hmt_sanctionsgb-hmt-f06f324cf5806ad2f716222f15aa09b55db4bd5b
gb-hmt-f06f324cf5806ad2f716222f15aa09b55db4bd5bSanction:modifiedAt2021gb_hmt_sanctionsgb-hmt-f06f324cf5806ad2f716222f15aa09b55db4bd5b
gb-hmt-f06f324cf5806ad2f716222f15aa09b55db4bd5bSanction:programChemical Weaponsgb_hmt_sanctionsgb-hmt-f06f324cf5806ad2f716222f15aa09b55db4bd5b
gb-hmt-f06f324cf5806ad2f716222f15aa09b55db4bd5bSanction:provisionsAsset freezegb_hmt_sanctionsgb-hmt-f06f324cf5806ad2f716222f15aa09b55db4bd5b
gb-hmt-f06f324cf5806ad2f716222f15aa09b55db4bd5bSanction:reasonPavel Popov is the Deputy Minister in the Ministry of Defence of the Russian Federation. In this capacity, he has overall responsibility for research activities. This includes the oversight and development of the Ministry’s scientific and technical capabilities, including the development of potential weapons, and modernisation of existing weapons and military equipment. The Russian Ministry of Defence took on the responsibility for the chemical weapons stocks inherited from the Soviet Union and their safe storage until their destruction could be completed. The Russian Ministry of Defence has overall responsibility for the safe storage and destruction of chemical weapons. Russian opposition leader Alexey Navalny was the victim of an attempted assassination during his August 2020 visit to Siberia, in which a chemical weapon—a toxic nerve agent of the Novichok group—was used. Given the use of such chemical weapons in the territory of the Russian Federation and the evidence of the continued involvement of the Russian MoD in the Novichok programme, this could only be on account of intent by the Ministry of Defence and its political leadership, which includes Pavel Popov. Russia had the technical capability to carry out the attack. The Russian State has previously produced Novichoks and would still be capable of doing so. Within the last decade, Russia has produced and stockpiled small quantities of Novichok. It is unlikely that Novichoks could be made and deployed by non-state actors (e.g. a criminal or terrorist group). Russia had the operational experience to carry out the attack. Russia has a proven record of state-sponsored assassination. It is highly likely that the Russian state was responsible for the attempted assassination of Sergei Skripal in Salisbury in 2018 using a similar type of nerve agent. During the 2000s, Russia commenced a programme to test means of delivering chemical warfare agents, including investigation of ways of delivering nerve agents. Russia had the motive and opportunity to carry out the attack. Navalny was a high profile Russian opposition politician who vocally criticised the Russian administration and establishment. He was on Russian territory under surveillance by the Federal Security Service of the Russian Federation at the time of the attack. Given Pavel Popov’s senior role in the Russian military, the evidence suggests that he is responsible for the preparation and use of chemical weapons in the attempted assassination of Alexey Navalny.gb_hmt_sanctionsgb-hmt-f06f324cf5806ad2f716222f15aa09b55db4bd5b
gb-hmt-f06f324cf5806ad2f716222f15aa09b55db4bd5bSanction:sourceUrl https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/financial-sanctions-consolidated-list-of-targetsgb_hmt_sanctionsgb-hmt-f06f324cf5806ad2f716222f15aa09b55db4bd5b
gb-hmt-f06f324cf5806ad2f716222f15aa09b55db4bd5bSanction:startDate2021gb_hmt_sanctionsgb-hmt-f06f324cf5806ad2f716222f15aa09b55db4bd5b
gb-hmt-f06f324cf5806ad2f716222f15aa09b55db4bd5bSanction:statusAsset Freeze Targetsgb_hmt_sanctionsgb-hmt-f06f324cf5806ad2f716222f15aa09b55db4bd5b
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