| Type | Vessel | [sources] | |||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Name | ELVA | [sources] | |||
| Build Date | [sources] | ||||
| Call Sign | S9A3 | [sources] | |||
| Deadweight Tonnage | 298465 | [sources] | |||
| Description | The tanker is involved in the transportation of sanctioned Iranian oil, in particular, the vessel was used by Iran in July 2023 to deliver almost 2 million barrels of Iranian light crude oil, and resorts to deceptive practices, including disabling the AIS system and conducting dark activities near Malaysia. Iran relies on an extensive network of tankers and ship management companies in multiple jurisdictions to transport its oil to foreign customers, using deceptive tactics such as falsifying documentation, manipulating ship tracking systems, and constantly changing ship names and flags. One of the most commonly used tactics to evade oil sanctions is 'flag hopping' in various national registries, which allows the vessel to carry out transportation and have the right to moor. This tactic is often accompanied by the creation of fictitious companies, change of owners, managers, ship names, and change of physical markings of the vessel. Some shipowners deliberately use flag registries to evade sanctions, many of which do not have the resources and capabilities to track and verify the history of ships. On December 03, 2024, USA imposed sanctions on the vessel. | [sources] | |||
| Flag | São Tomé and Príncipe | [sources] | |||
| Gross Registered Tonnage | 159383 | [sources] | |||
| IMO Number | IMO9196644 | [sources] | |||
| MMSI | 668116202 | [sources] | |||
| Past Flags | Bahamas · Isle of Man · Saint Kitts and Nevis | [sources] | |||
| Previous name | Ekaterina · Front Hakata · Hakata · Otina | [sources] | |||
| Type | 20 · Crude Oil Tanker · Oil tanker | [sources] | |||
| Source link | sanctionssearch.ofac.treas.gov | [sources] | |||
| Last change | Last processed | First seen | |||
The Consolidated Screening List (CSL) is a list of parties for which the United States Government maintains restrictions on certain exports, re-exports, or transfers of items.
United States · ITA
The primary United States' sanctions list, specially designated nationals (SDN) part.
United States · OFAC
Ships detained by Port State Control (PSC) authorities within the Tokyo MoU region.
Global · Tokyo MoU
Sponsors and accomplices of Russian armed aggression against Ukraine.
Ukraine · GUR
ua-ws-6d97d2cbd65d5599be0ec8ced8560a0f91d10390 · ofac-51361 · ua-ws-vessel-632 · tok-mou-det-6d4d7eb446b9498433d55b29ea6377ba268d3284For experts: raw data explorer
OpenSanctions is free for non-commercial users. Businesses must acquire a data license to use the dataset.
| Linked from | ||||
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Subject | Role | Start date | End date | |
| INAYA SHIP MANAGEMENT (PVT) LTD Export controlled · Sanctioned entity | commerce_manager | - | ||
| Owners | ||||
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Owner | Percentage held | Start date | End date | |
| Lufindo Holding Limited Export controlled · Sanctioned entity | - | - | ||
| - | Tokyo Memorandum of Understanding | - |
| United States | Office of Foreign Assets Control | Iran Sanctions | - | - |
| Related Recognised Organization |
| - |
| - |
| Overseas Marine Certification Service, Inc. (OMCS) | Classification society | - | - |
| Company Person of interest | security_manager | - |
| INAYA SHIP MANAGEMENT (PVT) LTD Export controlled · Sanctioned entity | Company | - | - |
| Lufindo Holding Limited Export controlled · Sanctioned entity | - | - | - |