Etibar EYYUB

Etibar Eyyub founded and runs a network of companies including Coral Energy (later 2Rivers Group). Through this network of companies, he enables shipments and exports of Russian oil, notably from the Russian state owned oil-company Rosneft, by concealing the actual origin of the oil. In particular, the 2Rivers network controls and utilises a large proportion of the vessels in Russia’s so-called “shadow fleet”. He is also involved in economic sectors providing a substantial source of revenue to the Government of the Russian Federation, which is responsible for the annexation of Crimea and the destabilisation of Ukraine.

Etibar Eyyub founded and runs a network of companies including Coral Energy (later 2Rivers Group). Through this network of companies, he enables shipments and exports of Russian oil, notably from the Russian state owned oil-company Rosneft, by concealing the actual origin of the oil. In particular, the 2Rivers network controls and utilises a large proportion of the vessels in Russia’s so-called “shadow fleet”. Therefore, Etibar Eyyub is significantly frustrating the provisions of Decision 2014/512/CFSP and Regulation (EU) No 833/2014. He is also involved in economic sectors providing a substantial source of revenue to the Government of the Russian Federation, which is responsible for the annexation of Crimea and the destabilisation of Ukraine.

Etibar Eyyub a fondé et dirigé un réseau d’entreprises, parmi lesquelles Coral Energy (devenue groupe 2Rivers). Par l’intermédiaire de ce réseau d’entreprises, il permet l’expédition et l’exportation de pétrole russe, notamment de la compagnie pétrolière publique russe Rosneft, en dissimulant la véritable origine du pétrole. En particulier, le réseau 2Rivers contrôle et utilise une grande partie des navires de la “flotte fantôme” de la Russie. Par conséquent, Etibar Eyyub porte gravement atteinte aux dispositions de la décision 2014/512/PESC et du règlement (UE) no 833/2014. Il est également impliqué dans des secteurs économiques fournissant une source substantielle de revenus au gouvernement de la Fédération de Russie, qui est responsable de l’annexion de la Crimée et de la déstabilisation de l’Ukraine.

Transport sanctions: where transport sanctions apply, a ship owned, controlled, chartered or operated by a designated person is prohibited from entering a port in the UK, may be given a movement or a port entry direction, can be detained, and will be refused permission to register on the UK Ship Register or have its existing registration terminated. Similarly, an aircraft owned, chartered or operated by a designated person is prohibited from overflying or landing in the UK, may be given a movement direction, can be detained or moved to a specified airport, and will be refused permission to register on the CAA Aircraft Register or have its existing registration terminated. This also includes a prohibition of technical assistance relating to aircraft and ships: a prohibition on the provision of technical assistance relating to aircraft or ships will prevent a person from directly or indirectly providing technical assistance to, or for the benefit of, the designated person, where that technical assistance relates to an aircraft or ship.