| Type | Vessel | [sources] | |||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Name | ANDAMAN SKIES · Andaman Skies · CONICO ATLAS | [sources] | |||
| Country | Russia | [sources] | |||
| Build Date | [sources] | ||||
| Call Sign | D6A4015 | [sources] | |||
| Deadweight Tonnage | 111013 | [sources] | |||
| Description | During the G7 and EU oil embargo and price-cap policy on russian oil, the tanker is involved in the export of russian oil to third countries from russian ports in the Black and Baltic seas. The international NGO Greenpeace refers to the tanker as part of the shadow fleet of tankers that transport russian oil around the world and threaten the environment. The tanker is certified by the Chinese regulator China Classification Society (IACS). The vessel is affiliated with one of the leading operators of the so-called 'shadow' fleet, Radiating World Shipping Services LLC (UAE, under United Kingdom sanctions). At the beginning of 2023, Radiating World Shipping Services LLC was one of the three largest carriers of russian oil, along with Fractal Marine Shipping (UAE) and Gatik Ship Management (India). At that time, the fleet of Fractal Marine Shipping, Radiating World Shipping Services and Gatik Ship Management consisted of about 90 tankers, 90% of which transported oil and oil products from the Baltic and Black Sea ports of russia to India, China, Turkey, the Middle East, Africa and South America. In order to circumvent the sanctions, Radiating World Shipping Services 're-registered' its fleet to related companies. Tankers operated/managed by Radiating World Shipping Services LLC continue to be used by related companies and call at russian ports. As sanctions are being imposed, russia uses a scheme of 'juggling' ships between related companies to conceal oil exports outside the price cap and other restrictions, as well as to hide the real owners of ships, and to ensure unimpeded transportation of fossil fuels by a 'shadow' fleet of obsolete oil tankers, creates new companies for these purposes (in the UAE, Hong Kong, India, Turkey, Mauritius, Seychelles, and other jurisdictions) with non-transparent organizational and ownership structures. In order to implement this scheme, technical/commercial management and ship owners are constantly changing, and vessels are renamed with a change of flag, MMSI, call-sign, including for sanctioned vessels. Shadow fleet vessels operate under "convenient flags", which allows them to conceal their true origin and avoid control by international organizations and insurance companies. The 'shadow' fleet, transporting huge volumes of crude oil through heavily trafficked routes through narrow straits close to the coastline, without proper P&I insurance, with automatic identification systems disabled, threatens an environmental disaster with significant economic costs to be borne by the affected coastal countries and/or the international community. The recent incidents off Malaysia only underscore the need for swift action to curb the potentially devastating impact of the growing 'shadow fleet'. 'Shadow' tankers have already been involved in 50 incidents from the Danish Straits all the way to Malaysia since russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine. According to CREA, from January to August 2024, the number of shadow tankers crossing the Danish Straits in Europe increased by 277% compared to the same period in 2022, with 64% of the 46 million tons of russian marine oil transported through the Danish Straits being transported by shadow tankers. In the same period, the number of shadow tankers in the Straits of Dover and Gibraltar increased by 355% compared to 2022, transporting 67% of the 37 million tons of oil through the straits. The Suez Canal experienced a staggering 649% increase in shadow tanker traffic, with 69% of the 52 million tons of russian crude oil passing through it being transported by these vessels. Thus, the 'shadow fleet' of the russian federation continues to provide multibillion-dollar revenues for the kremlin bypassing sanctions, disguising its activities under the flags of third countries, using complex schemes to conceal owners, and poses significant threats to environmental safety with significant economic costs for coastal countries and/or the international community due to the outdated and inadequate insurance of shadow fleet tankers. On December 17, 2024, the United Kingdom imposed sanctions on a vessel in connection with the transportation of oil or oil products originating in russia or from russia to a third country. On February 21, 2025, Canada imposed sanctions on the vessel. On February 24, March 04, 2025 EU and Switzerland respectively imposed sanctions on the tanker for transporting crude oil/oil products originating in or exported from russia using irregular and high-risk shipping practices as specified in the International Maritime Organization General Assembly resolution A.1192 (33) (EU sanctions will enter into force on February 25, 2025). In June 2025, Australia imposed sanctions on the vessel. On June 19, 2025, New Zealand imposed sanctions on the vessel. | [sources] | |||
| Flag | Honduras · Comoros | [sources] | |||
| IMO Number | IMO9288693 | [sources] | |||
| Past Flags | Cook Islands · Greece · Honduras · Tanzania | [sources] | |||
| Previous name | Andaman Skies · Delta Pioneer | [sources] | |||
| Type | 20 · Oil Tanker · Oil Tanker | Navire-citerne pour produits pétroliers | [sources] | |||
| Source link | eur-lex.europa.eu · eur-lex.europa.eu | [sources] | |||
| Last change | Last processed | First seen | |||
Transport crude oil or petroleum products, as listed in Annex 24, that originate in Russia or are exported from Russia while practicing irregular and high-risk shipping practices as set out in the International Maritime Organisation General Assembly resolution A.1192(33)
Shipping sanctions: a specified ship is prohibited from being provided with access to or having its master or pilot cause it to enter a port in the UK, may have its registration on the UK Ship Register terminated, and a master or pilot of a specified ship may be given a port barring direction, a detention direction, and a port entry direction or a movement
Switzerland manages a sanctions lists with a high degree of detail on the individuals that are subject to it's embargoes
Switzerland · SECO
Sponsors and accomplices of Russian armed aggression against Ukraine.
Ukraine · GUR
Supplemental list of people, companies, and organizations sanctioned for involvement in Russia's invasion of Ukraine.
European Union · Council
The Consolidated List is a list of all persons and entities who are subject to targeted financial sanctions under Australian sanctions law
Australia · DFAT
Official register of individuals, entities, and vessel subject to UK sanctions under regulations made pursuant to the Sanctions and Anti-Money Laundering Act 2018.
United Kingdom · FCDO
The EU Sanctions Map is a visualisation of EU sanctions policy. It includes a broader set of policies and entities than the EU consolidated sanctions list.
European Union · Council
Sanctions imposed by Canada on specific countries, organizations, or individuals under the Special Economic Measures Act (SEMA) and JVCFOA
Canada · Global Affairs Canada
ua-ws-7129365898a0470699fc2b4130235b290bb2855c · ca-sema-5afc4054ca9cdab90241e5e3b57142ac1d296c0b · eu-sancmap-e5db21a4c3289a1f5d02a04a3958529431c1d4b8 · ua-ws-vessel-433 · eu-oj-a3142158fe0762622da64e01900f25fdd761a550 · eu-sancmap-fd519c17d844babc17c9a27c919fdc8d1f7912d3 · ch-seco-89836 · ua-ws-2f5afe1ceac0d196e555b3a071f677c49328ca69 · gb-fcdo-rus2373 · au-dfat-8227-andaman-skiesFor experts: raw data explorer
OpenSanctions is free for non-commercial users. Businesses must acquire a data license to use the dataset.
| Linked from | ||||
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Subject | Role | Start date | End date | |
| Company Person of interest | security_manager | - | ||
| North of England P&I Association | ||||
| Owners | ||||
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Owner | Percentage held | Start date | End date | |
| Tachio Trading Ltd Person of interest | - | - | ||
| European Union | Council of the European Union | EU Designated Vessels (Council Regulation 833/2014) | - |
| Ukraine | ГУР МО України | Vessels involved in the transportation of weapons, stolen Ukrainian products and in the circumvention of sanctions | - | - |
| Australia | Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade | Sanctioned Vessels Regime | - |
| Switzerland | State Secretariat for Economic Affairs | Measures In Relation To The Situation In Ukraine | - |
| United Kingdom | Foreign, Commonwealth & Development Office · UK | Sanctions and Anti-Money Laundering Act 2018 | - |
| - |
| - |
| Aurelius Ship Management LLC Person of interest | commerce_manager | - |